



What the Commission Report says on:

THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE: PRIORITY ISSUES

Importance of the 2010 Review Conference.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty made provision for five-yearly meetings of its member states to “review the progress of the Treaty”. Particularly since the 1995 Review Conference, which had the responsibility of deciding whether the treaty was to continue in force – and which resolved that it should, indefinitely – these have become major occasions, in the words of the 1995 decision, to “look forward as well as back ...identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future [and] address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality”.

The 2000 Review Conference, taking place against the troubling background of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests, and the loss of momentum following the U.S. Senate’s failure to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), was successful particularly in reaching agreement on a series of measures that would advance disarmament (the “Thirteen Practical Steps”). But the 2005 conference was an unrelieved disaster, with considerable evident backsliding on disarmament by key weapon states, and no agreement reached about anything at all. All eyes are now on the May 2010 Review Conference, in the hope that it will not only recapture lost ground but advance significantly both the disarmament and non-proliferation agendas. In the new atmosphere which has accompanied, in particular, the change of U.S. administration, there is some optimism that this will happen.

The review conference process itself is disconcertingly complex for the uninitiated, with a preparatory committee process extending over three years and the conference itself involving three major committees – on disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses respectively – wrestling with literally hundreds of working papers and competing draft texts. It is important in this context that attention be prioritized, with the main goal being to reach agreement on a relatively small number of important substantive issues. While many issues ranging beyond this core will be debated and the subject of proposed resolutions, for 2010 we believe that priority attention should be focused on reaching agreement in the areas specified below, in particular the first three.

In the lead-up to the 2010 Review Conference it is important, in order to build a sense of, and heighten expectations as to, what may be achievable, that action be pursued on as many as possible of the related “Short Term Action Agenda to 2012” items identified in the report – including early U.S.-Russian agreement on a START follow-on treaty making big cuts in deployed strategic weapons; efforts to bring the North Korean and Iran situations closer to resolution; a serious start to negotiations in Geneva on fissile material production cut-off; and significant forward movement on the counter-terrorism and related nuclear security issues to be debated at the President Obama-initiated summit scheduled for April 2010.

[Section 16, Paras 16.1-5, Rec 41]

The full text of *Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers*, Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, Co-chairs Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi (November 2009), is available at www.icnnd.org

Priorities for the 2010 NPT Review Conference

1. *Action for Disarmament.* Agreement on a twenty-point statement, “A New International Consensus for Action on Nuclear Disarmament” Bo updating and extending the “Thirteen Practical Steps” agreed in 2000.

2. *Strengthening Safeguards and Enforcement.* Agreement:

- that all states should accept the application of the Additional Protocol and that, to encourage its universal take-up, acceptance should be made a condition of all states’ nuclear exports;
- to declare that a state withdrawing from the NPT is not free to use for non-peaceful purposes nuclear materials, equipment and technology acquired while party to the NPT;
- to recommend that the Security Council make it clear that any withdrawal will be regarded prima facie as a threat to international peace and security; and
- to recommend to states that they make it a condition of nuclear exports that safeguards agreements continue to apply after any such withdrawal.

3. *Strengthening the IAEA.* Agreement that the IAEA’s budget be significantly increased – without any “zero real growth constraint”, and so as to reduce reliance on extra-budgetary support for key functions – as recommended in 2008 by the Zedillo Commission.

4. *Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone.* Agreement that the Secretary-General of the UN should convene an early conference of all relevant states to address creative and fresh ways to implement the 1995 resolution, including the identification of confidence building measures that all key states in the region can embrace, and to commence early consultations to facilitate that.

5. *Nuclear security.* Agreement that states should take further measures to strengthen the security of nuclear materials and facilities, including early adoption of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the most recent international standards, accelerated implementation of the cooperative threat reduction and associated programs worldwide, and greater commitment to international capacity building and information sharing.

6. *Peaceful uses.* Agreement that the inalienable right to use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes remains one of the fundamental objectives of the NPT and dedicate increased resources, including through the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Programme, to assist developing states in taking full advantage of peaceful nuclear energy for human development.