Eliminating Nuclear Threats

A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers



GARETH EVANS and YORIKO KAWAGUCHI CO-CHAIRS                    Commission Members

Annex A: Commission Recommendations

On Overall Disarmament Strategy

1. Nuclear disarmament should be pursued as a two-phase process: with “minimization” to be achieved no later than 2025, and “elimination” as soon as possible thereafter. Short (to 2012), medium (to 2025) and longer term (beyond 2025) action agendas should reflect those objectives. [7.1–5; see also Sections 17,18, 19]

2. Short and medium term efforts should focus on achieving the general delegitimation of nuclear weapons, and on reaching as soon as possible, and no later than 2025, a “minimization point” characterised by:

(a) low numbers: a world with no more than 2,000 warheads (less than 10 per cent of present arsenals);

(b) agreed doctrine: every nuclear-armed state committed to no first use of nuclear weapons; and

(c) credible force postures: verifiable deployments and alert status reflecting that doctrine. [7.6–15; see also Sections 6 (on delegitimation) and 17–18]

3. Analysis and debate should commence now on the conditions necessary to move from the minimization point to elimination, even if a target date for getting to zero cannot now be credibly specified. [7.15–17; see also Section 19]

On Overall Non-proliferation Strategy

4. Nuclear non-proliferation efforts should focus both on the demand side – persuading states that nuclear weapons will not advance their national security or other interests – and the supply side, through maintaining and strengthening a comprehensive array of measures (addressed in following recommendations) designed to make it as difficult as possible for states to buy or build such weapons. [8.9–16; see also Sections 9–15]

On NPT Safeguards and Verification

5. All states should accept the application of the Additional Protocol. To encourage universal take-up, acceptance of it should be a condition of all nuclear exports. [9.7]

6. The Additional Protocol and its annexes should be updated and strengthened to make clear the IAEA’s right to investigate possible weaponization activity, and by adding specific reference to dual-use items, reporting on export denials, shorter notice periods and the right to interview specific individuals. [9.8–9]

7. With safeguards needing to move from a mechanistic to an information-driven system, there should be much more information sharing, in both directions, on the part of both states and the IAEA, with the agency re-evaluating its culture of confidentiality and non-transparency. [9.10–11]

On NPT Compliance and Enforcement

8. In determining compliance, the IAEA should confine itself essentially to technical criteria, applying them with consistency and credibility, and leaving the political consequences for the Security Council to determine. [9.15]

9. The UN Security Council should severely discourage withdrawal from the NPT by making it clear that this will be regarded as prima facie a threat to international peace and security, with all the punitive consequences that may follow from that under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. [9.20]

10. A state withdrawing from the NPT should not be free to use for non-peaceful purposes nuclear materials, equipment and technology acquired while party to the NPT. Any such material provided before withdrawal should so far as possible be returned, with this being enforced by the Security Council. [9.21–22]

11. All states should make it a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient state agree that, in the event it should withdraw from the NPT, safeguards shall continue with respect to any nuclear material and equipment provided previously, as well as any material produced by using it. [9.23]

On Strengthening the IAEA

12. The IAEA should make full use of the authority already available to it, including special inspections, and states should be prepared to strengthen its authority as deficiencies are identified. [9.24]

13. If the IAEA is to fully and effectively perform its assigned functions, it should be given, as recommended in 2008 by the Zedillo Commission:

(a) a one-off injection of funds to refurbish the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory;

(b) a significant increase in its regular budget support, without a “zero real growth” constraint, so as to reduce reliance on extra-budgetary funding for key functions;

(c) sufficient security of future funding to enable medium to long-term planning; and

(d) support from both states and industry in making staff secondments and offering training opportunities. [9.25–27]

14. Consideration should be given to an external review, by the Zedillo Commission or a successor panel, of the IAEA’s organizational culture, in particular on questions of transparency and information sharing. [9.28]

On Non-NPT Treaties and Mechanisms

15. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should develop a criteria-based approach to cooperation agreements with states outside the NPT, taking into account factors such as ratification of the CTBT, willingness to end unsafeguarded fissile material production, and states’ records in securing nuclear facilities and materials and controlling nuclear-related exports. [10.3–9]

16. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) should be reconstituted within the UN system as a neutral organization to assess intelligence, coordinate and fund activities, and make both generic and specific recommendations or decisions concerning the interdiction of suspected materials being carried to or from countries of proliferation concern. [10.10–12]

On Extending Obligations to Non-NPT States

17. Recognizing the reality that the three nuclear-armed states now outside the NPT – India, Pakistan and Israel – are not likely to become members any time soon, every effort should be made to achieve their participation in parallel instruments and arrangements which apply equivalent non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. [10.13–16]

18. Provided they satisfy strong objective criteria demonstrating commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation, and sign up to specific future commitments in this respect, these states should have access to nuclear materials and technology for civilian purposes on the same basis as an NPT member. [10.17]

19. These states should participate in multilateral disarmament negotiations on the same basis as the nuclear-weapon state members of the NPT, and not be expected to accept different treatment because of their non-membership of that treaty. [10.18]

On Banning Testing

20. All states that have not already done so should sign and ratify the CTBT unconditionally and without delay. Pending entry into force, all states should continue to refrain from nuclear testing. [11.1–8]

21. All signatories should provide the necessary financial, technical and political support for the continued development and operation of the CTBTO, including completing the global coverage of its monitoring systems, facilitating on-site inspection when warranted, and establishing effective national data centres and information gathering systems.

On Limiting the Availability of Fissile Material

22. All states should negotiate to an early conclusion in the Conference on Disarmament a non-discriminatory, multilateral, internationally and effectively verifiable and irreversible Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. [12.1–14]

23. All nuclear-armed states should declare or maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapon purposes pending the entry into force of such a treaty. [12.15]

24. On the question of pre-existing stocks, a phased approach should be adopted, with the first priority a cap on production; then an effort to ensure that all fissile material other than in weapons becomes subject to irreversible, verified non-explosive use commitments; and with fissile material released through dismantlement being brought under these commitments as weapon reductions are agreed. [12.18]

25. As an interim step, all nuclear-armed states should voluntarily declare their fissile material stocks and the amount they regard as excess to their weapons needs, place such excess material under IAEA safeguards as soon as practicable, and convert it as soon as possible to forms that cannot be used for nuclear weapons. [12.19]

26. The use of HEU in civil research programs should be ended as soon as possible, and the availability and use of separated plutonium in energy programs phased out as viable alternatives are established. [12.20–27]

On Nuclear Security

27. All states should agree to take further measures to strengthen the security of nuclear materials and facilities, including early adoption of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the most recent international standards, accelerated implementation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) and associated programs worldwide, and greater commitment to international capacity building and information sharing.
[13.1–16, 22–23]

28. At the Global Summit on Nuclear Security in April 2010, and in subsequent follow-up activity, priority attention should be given to the implementation-focused issues identified in Box 13-1. [13.4]

29. On the control of material useable for “dirty bombs”, further efforts need to be made to cooperatively implement the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, with assistance to states in updating legislation and licensing practice, promoting awareness among users, and generally achieving a safety and security culture. [13.17–21]

30. Efforts should continue to be made to establish an intelligence clearing house which would provide a mechanism by which countries might be willing not only to share their intelligence, but also provide the know-how for other countries to interpret and deal with it. [13.22]

31. Strong support should be given to the emerging science of nuclear forensics, designed to identify the sources of materials found in illicit trafficking or used in nuclear explosions, including through providing additional resources to the Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group. [13.24–25]

On Nuclear Energy Management

32. The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should continue to be strongly supported as one of the three fundamental pillars of the NPT, along with disarmament and non-proliferation. Increased resources should be provided, including through the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Programme, to assist developing states in taking full advantage of peaceful nuclear energy for human development. [14.1–3]

33. Support should be given to the initiative launched at the 2008 Hokkaido Toyako G8 Summit for international cooperation on nuclear energy infrastructure, designed to raise awareness worldwide of the importance of the three Ss – safeguards, security and safety – and assist countries concerned in developing the relevant measures. [14.4–6]

34. Proliferation resistance should be endorsed by governments and industry as an essential objective in the design and operation of nuclear facilities, and promoted through both institutional and technical measures – neither is sufficient without the other. [14.7–8]

35. The increasing use of plutonium recycle, and the prospective introduction of fast neutron reactors, must be pursued in ways which enhance non-proliferation objectives and avoid adding to proliferation and terrorism risks. In particular, a key objective of research and development on fast neutron reactors should be to design and operate them so that weapons grade plutonium is not produced. [14.9–15]

36. International measures such as spent fuel take-back arrangements by fuel suppliers, are desirable to avoid increasing spent fuel accumulations in a large number of states. Particular attention should be paid in this respect to take-back of fuel from initial core loads. [14.13]

37. New technologies for spent fuel treatment should be developed to avoid current forms of reprocessing altogether; and, as they are established, use of MOX fuel in thermal reactors, and conventional reprocessing plants, can be phased out. [12.26]

38. Nuclear industry, and government-industry collaboration, will need to play a greater role in mitigating the proliferation risks associated with a growing civilian nuclear sector worldwide. Industry should become a more active partner with governments in the drafting of regulations and treaties that affect its activities, to ensure that they make operational sense and to encourage compliance. [14.16–24]

On Multilateralizing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

39. Multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle – in particular through fuel banks and multilateral management of enrichment, reprocessing and spent fuel storage facilities – should be strongly supported. Such arrangements would play an invaluable role in building global confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and provide an important foundation for a world free of nuclear weapons, for which a necessary requirement will be multilateral verification and control of all sensitive fuel cycle activities. [15.48]

40. Pending the acceptance of more far-reaching proposals, support should be given to voluntary arrangements whereby, in return for assurances of supply, recipient states would renounce the national construction and operation of sensitive fuel cycle facilities for the duration of the agreement. [15.47]

On Priorities for the 2010 NPT Review Conference

41. The following should be the major priority issues for the 2010 NPT Review Conference:

(a) Action for Disarmament. Agreement on a twenty-point statement, “A New International Consensus for Action on Nuclear Disarmament” (see Box 16-1), updating and extending the “Thirteen Practical Steps” agreed in 2000.

(b) Strengthening Safeguards and Enforcement. Agreement:


Next: Annex B: Members of the Commission